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The Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman
Judge's Perspective*
The Honorable Patricia M. Wald**
I am going to break the rules for luncheon speakers, who
should stick to humorous, or at least innocuous, subjects, by tack-
ling a somber and troublesome one: the role of morality in judging,
particularly in constitutional adjudication, and particularly for wo-
men. We are all women judges, whose jobs inevitably involve
moral judgments of one kind or another, even if we don't always
think about it that way. The role of morality in judging is a very
lively current topic in law reviews and in popular critiques of the
judicial process. Unfortunately, except for the literature of femi-
nist jurisprudence, the treatment is almost exclusively by male au-
thors and judges. Other speakers have emphasized the need to
infuse more women judges into judicial education, judicial poli-
cymaking, and administration. I bid for more women judges and
women law teachers to enter the thorny but important area of ju-
dicial philosophy. Its theories inform, constrain, and are used as a
benchmark for critiquing our decision making. I think it impera-
tive that we make our individual and collective points of view
heard in the debate.
The concept of "morality" makes us all squirm a bit. A re-
cent New York Times book review describes our ambivalence:
Today there seems to be growing discomfort, if not embarrass-
ment, with the question of morality .... [T]ell us that "Smith
is a very moral man," and we are not at all sure we want to be
involved with him. "Moralist" is often a pejorative term, and
the word "morality" itself seems to be slipping in that direc-
tion . . .for at the heart of the problem there is this unan-
swered question: "What is morality?"'
Nonetheless, the relationship between judicial decision mak-
ing and something called "morality" is very much with us these
days. I will not dwell on transparently partisan attacks on judges
or judicial candidates for nonconformity with a particular concept
* Keynote address given at the National Association of Women Judges
Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 12, 1985.
** United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1985, § 7 (Book Review), at 31, col. 2.
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of "morality." Nor will I focus on any of the highly visible moral
issues currently in the courts-abortion, homosexuality, care of
the homeless, remedies for racial inequality. Rather, I want to
raise with you some basic questions about the process by which a
judge, particularly a woman judge, goes about dealing with issues
that involve morality-her own, the community's, the fundamental
morality of the Constitution.
My colleague Judge Robert Bork recently published a provoc-
ative lecture on Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law .2
He began by voicing a concern I share that "[t]oo few people are
aware of the trends [in constitutional law] and the importance of
those trends for public policy."3 He continues, however, to say
that our legal institutions, particularly law schools, have mistak-
enly advanced "an ideology of the Constitution that demands ...
an infusion of [outside] moral and political notions."4 He cites as
an example the "incorrect" view of the first amendment "that the
only kinds of harm that a community is entitled to suppress are
physical and economic" harms and not moral harms.5 He calls this
discounting by the law of harm to community morality the "priva-
tization of morality" or "moral relativism," and suggests we adopt
the "common sense of the community" as a sufficient norm for
moral harms against which the community may legislate.6
Intriguingly, Judge Bork identifies the wife of John Stuart
Mill, author of On Liberty, as a source for the view that individual
morality should transcend community morals. "It would," he
writes, "be ironic... if we owed major features of modern Ameri-
can constitutional doctrine to Harriet Taylor Mill, who was not, as
best I can remember, one of the framers at Philadelphia."7 His ba-
sic thrust, however, is to discredit the "capacity of ideas that origi-
nate outside the Constitution to influence judges, usually without
their being aware of it, so that those ideas are elevated to constitu-
tional doctrine."8 Notions like moral relativism and egalitarian-
ism, he says, lack the legitimacy of democratic choice but have
insidiously invaded constitutional decision making through
judges.9 Judges' attempts through moral reasoning to frame con-
stitutional theories have removed from democratic control areas of
2. Robert Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law (1984).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 2-3.
5. Id. at 3.
6. id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6-7.
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life the framers intended to leave to the political branches.O
Judges should not-he continues-simply enforce what they
think are good values." The Constitution meant to let people
choose democratically to have a public morality. Expanding indi-
vidual freedoms under the cover of doctrines like autonomy and
privacy runs counter to that communal morality. Thus, the Fram-
ers' intentions, as to those few freedoms that do lie outside the
reach of the majority, are the "sole legitimate premise" for finding
constitutional rights that transcend the majority will.12 He goes on
then to describe a moral judge in these terms:
In a constitutional democracy the moral content of law must
be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never
by the morality of the judge. The sole task of the latter ... is
to translate the framer's or the legislator's morality into a rule
to govern unforeseen circumstances. That abstinence from
giving his own desires free play, that continuing and self-con-
scious renunciation of power, that is the morality of the
jurist.1 3
Judge Bork recently translated his call for judicial abstention
from moral reasoning into practice in a much discussed opinion,
Dronenburg v. Zech,14 involving a constitutional challenge to the
discharge of an overtly homosexual officer from the Navy. He re-
fused to find in the privacy line of cases that began with Griswold
v. Connecticut, the contraception case,15 and ended with Roe v.
Wade, the abortion case, 16 any mandate or authorization to recog-
nize a right to freedom of sexual conduct for consenting adults.17
He announced that community morality provides enough of a ra-
tional basis for legislation or executive action sanctioning aberrant
sexual conduct. "If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant
proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through
the moral choices of the people and their elected representatives,
not through the ukase of this court."' 8
Judge Bork's ideal of the restrained amoral judge has some
appeal. And his desire to constrain the search for fundamental
values in the Constitution to the ones our Founding Fathers held
is shared by other scholars and judges of the originalist school of
constitutional interpretation. In their view, judges are not free to
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 11.
14. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. 741 F.2d at 1396.
18. Id. at 1397.
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find "new" rights in the Constitution, based on their own or
others' notions of morality or philosophy. Only rights that are
clearly traceable to the text of the Constitution or at least infera-
ble from contemporaneous statements of the Framers deserve pro-
tection against the current majority, even when that majority is
legislating solely to protect or entrench its own morality, rather
than to protect against more concrete social or economic harms.
Before we as judges, as women judges, rush to embrace this
philosophy in toto, there are things we ought to think about.
Judge Bork reminded us that Harriet Taylor Mill was not one of
the Founding Fathers, whose ideas alone the originalists would
credit in interpreting the Constitution. Of course, there are no
women eligible for such status. One may consult the Federalist
Papers, the Records of the Convention, the letters of Madison, Jef-
ferson, and Hamilton in vain for evidence of any woman's influ-
ence on the Constitution.19 As judges, should we be frozen
through eternity into a mold of constitutional analysis that pre-
vailed in 1789, an age that gave no thought whatsoever to women
as equal participants in community and national life. Indeed, if
that was the Framers' intent, perhaps more heed should have been
given to Jefferson's proposal that the Constitution be good only for
thirty-four years and each new generation should make its own
constitution commitment anew.20
Lest you think I am too extravagant, let me give an illustra-
tion of an originalist-type argument put forth, ironically, by one of
our most liberal, civil rights-oriented academics, Professor Tom
Emerson of Yale. In answering feminist theorist Professor
Catharine MacKinnon, who argues for a civil right of women
against pornography, he says:
Obviously, the founding fathers, whatever restrictions
they might have found constitutionally permissible with re-
spect to sexually explicit speech, could not have intended the
19. Twelve years before the Constitutional Convention, in 1777, Abigail Adams
did address her husband on the subject of women and the Constitution. She wrote:
In the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for
you to make, I desire you would remember the ladies and be more
generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such
unlimited power into the hands of the husbands. Remember, all men
would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not
paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will
not hold ourselves bound by any law in which we have no voice or
representation.
Abigail Adams, Familiar Letters, 149050, quoted in Hillsdale College v. Department
of HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
20. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, Sept. 6, 1789, in
The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 488, 492 (Adrienne Koch &
William Peden eds. 1972).
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first amendment to allow the government to prohibit all
speech that supported male domination. On Professor
MacKinnon's own analysis, the very idea could not have oc-
curred to them as members of the dominant male hierarchy.
Insofar as "original intention" is a guide to constitutional in-
terpretation, then, it runs squarely counter to the position
taken by the proponents of the Indianapolis Ordinance.
21
One certainly does not have to be a supporter of Professor
MacKinnon's ordinance to be concerned about the implications for
women of an originalist's view of constitutional interpretation. In-
deed, except for the fact that certain rights, such as access to con-
traception or abortion, have already been established by the
Supreme Court, they too would succumb to this doctrine. And, in
view of the continuous attack on those rulings, we cannot feel too
secure about their longevity.
There is also little doubt this originalist theory excludes wo-
men-particularly women judges-from contributing any special
modes of analysis, ways of thinking, or moral concepts of their
own to the development of constitutional rights and values. Pro-
fessor Kenneth Karst of UCLA Law School has written:
The men who wrote the Constitution in 1787 designed a frame-
work for governing society as it was perceived by men and run
by men .... The Bill of Rights, like the original Constitution,
defined zones of autonomy, of noninterference. The whole en-
terprise of constitution-making, from its theoretical underpin-
nings to its consummation as a political bargain, was
relentlessly contractual. In short, the Constitution from the
beginning reflected the view from the ladder: safety from ag-
gression was to be found not in connection with others but in
rules reinforcing separation and noninterference. 22
The ladder, of course, refers to the ground-breaking study by
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, of the separate ways in which
men and women define and apply fundamental concepts of moral-
ity.23 In briefest form, Gilligan finds that for men, the metaphor is
the ladder, for women it is the web. Men tend to see and to judge
human interactions as the contractual arrangements of individuals
seeking position in a hierarchy.
Women ... tend to see the same interactions as part of ongo-
ing, sharing connections in a network of relationships. The
view from the ladder tends to produce ... an abstract hierar-
chy of moral rules to govern the competition of highly individ-
uated individuals. To see the world from the web, however, is
to see individuals in connection with each other, and to see
21. Thomas Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment, A Reply to Pro-
fessor MacKinnon, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 130, 132 (1984).
22. Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J. 447.
23. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982).
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morality as a question of responsibilities to particular people in
particular [circumstances].24
In Karst's words, "American law is predominantly a system of the
ladder, by the ladder, and for the ladder."25
Karst ambitiously proposes a reconstruction of constitutional
law that recognizes the need to protect the web as well as the lad-
der-"After all, there is . . . much to be said for a constitutional
law that takes into account a view of life, self, and morality that is
the dominant mode among the female half of the nation's popula-
tion." 26 One need not subscribe fully to Karst's revisionisms nor to
the terminal diagnosis of at least one feminist jurisprudence writer
who says "gendered concepts are constructs of the male experi-
ence, imposed from the male standpoint on society as a whole, lib-
eral morality expresses male supremacist politics,"27 to be troubled
by the potential blocking action of the originalist school of inter-
pretation on women judges' future contribution to constitutional
jurisprudence.
Now in fairness, some originalists do distinguish between the
process of discovering "new" rights in the Constitution and ex-
panding rights already there to meet new situations. Thus, Judge
Bork has written in a different case that although libel law at the
time of the Constitution would have covered certain kinds of fac-
tual statements, today's huge jury verdicts and their resultant po-
tential for chilling press freedom makes it necessary nowadays to
afford constitutional protection to those same kind of statements.
28
That expansion he finds to be in line with "a judicial tradition of a
continuing evolution of doctrine to serve the central purpose of the
first amendment."29 "[I]t is the task of the judge in this generation
to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the
world they knew, apply to the world we know. The world changes
in which unchanging values find their application."30
You, like I, may find that distinction difficult to parse.
Whether a right already exists and need only be accommodated to
a new situation or whether a new right has to be declared-comes
down to the level of generality with which the right is defined in
the first place. Thus the court in Dronenburg could not find any
24. Karst, supra note 22, at 462.
25. Id. at 462.
26. Id. at 463.
27. Catharine MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 321, 330
(1984).
28. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc)(Bork, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985).




right to sexual privacy in Supreme Court precedent,31 but several
months after Dronenburg, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit found in
the same cases a discernible and distinct principle covering private
adult consensual homosexual conduct, that is "quintessentially pri-
vate and lies at the heart of an intimate association beyond the
proper reach of state regulation."32 A few months later the Fifth
Circuit, en banc, in a third case, disagreed with that reading, find-
ing "homosexual conduct is not a constitutionally protected liberty
interest" and "[in view of the strong objection to homosexual con-
duct, which has prevailed in Western culture for the past seven
centuries, we cannot say that [the statute barring it] is 'totally un-
related to the pursuit of' .. implementing morality, a permissible
state goal . . .,33
But since originalism asserts it is the Framers' values and
their morality that must somehow be extrapolated to make the
necessary constitutional adjustments to a contemporary society,
there is still no room in that process for what we have learned in
the intervening two hundred years or more for the infusion of wo-
men's morality into constitutional interpretations. Karst cites sev-
eral examples of what he calls women's "morality of care and
responsibility" that could influence doctrines of constitutional law.
One is a redefinition of discrimination, "abandoning the require-
ment of a showing of discriminatory purpose in favor of a principle
recognizing a law's discriminatory impact[s] as a constitutional
harm" in themselves;34 another is a recognition of affirmative con-
stitutional responsibilities to relieve persons from some intolerable
burdens, such as hunger.35 Whether or not we agree with his ex-
amples, we may be reluctant as judges to be consigned rigidly to a
surrogate role of putting ourselves in the Founding Fathers' shoes
in order to divine what they would have done about a situation
they could not possibly have predicted 200 years ago.
Yet another disturbing consequence of originalism is that by
limiting constitutional protection to the very narrow class of rights
expressly envisioned by the Framers two centuries ago, or in sub-
sequent amendments, judges ensure conventional or traditional
morality will carry the day in all other cases. The content of that
morality will be determined by popularly elected legislatures and
executive branches. Judge Posner, in his book The Federal Courts,
31. 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
32. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 342 (1985).
33. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985)(en banc)(citations omitted).
34. Karst, supra note 22, at 488.
35. Id. at 493.
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suggests due process in the fourteenth amendment should not in-
clude any rights not legislated by a majority of states.36 One of the
judges concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing in
Dronenburg said, "It simply cannot seriously be maintained . . .
that the right of privacy extends beyond . . . traditional [family]
relationships . . . ."37 Conventional morality is deserving of re-
spect and deference in most cases, but in the words of one scholar,
it should be a significant player in the constitutional discourse, but
not the "trump card." 38 There are higher values to be found im-
plicitly as well as explicitly in the Constitution which judges
should be free to honor. By now it has become almost trite to cite
Justice Bradley's famous concurrence a century ago in Bradwell v.
Illinois ,39 where the Supreme Court found no constitutional right
of a qualified woman to be admitted to the practice of law:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of
man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organi-
zation, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of wo-
manhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution
is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and in-
dependent career from that of her husband.40
That was conventional morality in 1873. We have come a
long way since then, but not far enough. The National Association
of Women Judges' studies on gender bias in the courts suggest
residual prejudice against women in assessing personal injury dam-
ages, sentencing, divorce and child custody, and juvenile justice.41
Some of the feminist scholars strongly assert there is no such
thing as gender-free conventional morality. And if we are to de-
pend exclusively on legislatures to define morality, we must accept
36. Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 194 (1985).
37. 746 F.2d 1579, 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(statement of Starr, J.)(reh'g denied en
banc).
38. Thomas Morawetz, Constitutional Review and Moral Premise: The Future
of an Illusion 20 (June 13, 1985) (Colloquium Paper presented at Woodrow Wilson
Int'l Center for Scholars, Smithsonian).
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Gender Bias in Courts, 7 Jud. Conf. Rep. No. 1 (1985)(New Jersey
study looked to gender bias in sentencing, personal injury damages, juvenile justice,




the fact that those legislatures contain only a small number of wo-
men. Thus a judge constricted by majority-defined morality would
have a hard time protecting a wife against interspousal rape, or in-
cluding sexual harassment in the definition of sex discrimination,
or finding a right to comparable worth if the state legislature had
not yet acted to do so.
Another problem with exalting conventional morality in con-
stitutional discourse is that many decisions involve choices be-
tween different conventional moralities. Professor Morawetz
notes, "In a pluralistic society subject to both rapid technological
change and rapid spread of attitudes and ideas by public media, it
is a daunting if not quixotic project to identify conventional mo-
rality."42 And J. Anthony Lukas, in an op ed piece in the New
York Times discussing the strife-ridden history of school desegre-
gation in Boston, pointed out that "one of the deepest divisions in
American life [is] between the demands of equality and the call of
community."43 Lukas wrote:
In recent years Boston and other American cities have learned
that they have to make some hard choices: between racial jus-
tice and self-determination, between equality of educational
opportunity and neighborhood schools, between a black child's
right to a desegregated education and a white mother's right to
control her own child's upbringing. What makes this experi-
ence rise to the level of genuine tragedy is precisely that these
are not choices between right and wrong, or between judicial
dictatorship and sound social policy, but between competing
values, between right and right.4 4
The fact is there is no way for the originalists to take judges
completely out of the business of making moral choices in consti-
tutional cases, and judges will have to draw on more than the
Framers' intent or conventional moralities to make those choices.
Professor Van Alstyne tells us that in most other countries with
written constitutions, the constitutions are in fact interpreted only
by the majoritarian branches with no appeal allowed to the courts
for enforcement by individual citizens. 45 Enforcement of individ-
ual constitutional rights by our courts has been this country's
unique contribution to constitutional jurisprudence. Few of us are
ready to blow the whistle on it just yet. There is, after all, some-
thing inherently contradictory in relying exclusively on majority
42. Morawetz, supra note 38, at 21; see generally John Ely, Democracy and Dis-
trust (1980).
43. J. Anthony Lukas, Community and Equality in Conflict, N.Y. Times, Sept.
8, 1985, at E25, col. 2 (emphasis added).
44. Id.




morality to determine a minority's fundamental rights against
that very majority. Most constitutional issues are difficult pre-
cisely because they arise out of the fissures in whatever social con-
sensus may otherwise exist. "To have a right against the majority,
good only so long as the majority values its exercise, is to have no
right at all."46
If, then, we decide to reject the originalists and the conven-
tional moralists as our oracles on the hard questions of morality,
where should we look for guidance? Some judicial philosophers
say judges should search for the enduring, timeless, and important
values that reside in the Constitution and transcend conventional
morality. 47 Indeed, one of the most eminent English jurispruden-
tialists, H.L.A. Hart, has declared that "[t]he law of every modern
state shows at a thousand points the influence of both the accepted
social morality and wider moral ideals. These influences enter
into law either abruptly and avowedly through legislation, or si-
lently and piecemeal through the judicial process." 48
In Professor Alexander Bickel's philosophy, the "[Supreme]
Court is an educator whose mission is to instruct and elevate, to
bring out the best in us and show us where our own convictions
lead."49 Bickel's "principle-defining process" in the Constitution
requires a familiarity with the moral tradition within which
one is working and a talent for combining or extending the el-
ements of this tradition in novel ways to cover previously un-
resolved (or nonexistent) problems .... [I]t is never
principled either to limit or extend a constitutional norm
merely to reflect existing majoritarian views .... 50
The judge's job is to identify the "moral trajectory" of "enduring
values" in the nation's life and help guide them forward, at the
same time she employs the "passive virtues" of occasionally post-
poning confrontation, and accommodating to existing institutions
to ensure societal acceptance of inevitable but nonetheless unpopu-
lar decisions.51
All of this, I know, is heavy stuff. I will be candid. I find the
conceptualization of many of these theories easier than their exe-
cution. While Professor Karst encouragingly tells us, "I am per-
46. Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. Calif. L. Rev.
277, 395 (discussing the arguments of John Hart Ely); see also Morawetz, supra
note 38, at 34.
47. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 46, at 277, 393.
48. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 199 (1961).
49. Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale
L.J. 1567, 1581 (1985).




suaded that [a distinctive moral perspective] will be progressively
infused into our public life as more and more women [become
judges] and. . . [c]onstitutional law in particular is a field in which
movement toward the values of the network may come sooner
rather than later,"52 there are very few road maps in the law re-
views or even in the judges' manual. Moreover, my seven years on
the bench strongly suggests that not all the writers and thinkers in
the originalist school practice what they preach, either. In the end
we are left to depend on our own intellectual and moral resources,
on our respect for precedent, the letter and the spirit, and our ap-
praisal of the strength and the vulnerability of the legal and social
structure of which we are a part. Karst calls this "contextual mo-
rality"53 and says women's morality emphasizes context-"the
needs of real people in the fullness of their real situations."5 4
Gilligan describes the interaction of "an ethic of justice [that] pro-
ceeds from the premise of equality-that everyone should be
treated the same-[and] an ethic of care [that] rests on the premise
of nonviolence--that no one should be hurt."55 This dialogue, she
suggests, will lead to the ultimate morality.56
Law is and should be based on morality, but the Constitution
is still a vehicle to prevent the political majority from denying mi-
norities their rights in the name of morality simply because it dis-
approves of the way they will exercise those rights. Judging moral
cases is hard and controversial work. We are not all Marshalls,
Stones, Harlans, Frankfurters, or Blacks. But we are thoughtful
and worldly women, in the truest sense of the words. Our individ-
ual experiences as citizens, yes, as women, play a legitimate part in
the moral reasoning through which we filter history, relevant pre-
cedent, prevailing traditions, and conventional morality in search
of the enduring values that perpetuate a constitutional democracy.
We should not too quickly subscribe to a theory of judicial inter-
pretation that says none of this has any worth. When cases of gen-
uine conflicts between majoritarian morals and minority claimants
52. Karst, supra note 22, at 506-07.
53. Id. at 495.
54. Id.
55. Gilligan, supra note 23, at 174.
56. Gilligan states:
This dialogue between fairness and care not only provides a better un-
derstanding of relations between the sexes but also gives rise to a
more comprehensive portrayal of adult work and family relationships.
• . . [W]e can begin to envision how a marriage between adult de-
velopment as it is currently portrayed and women's development as it
begins to be seen could lead to a changed understanding of human de-




to constitutional rights arise, we should as judges openly confront
the conflicts, not in order to decide according to our own predilec-
tions, but in order to make the necessary inquiry into whether
constitutional verities must override popular morality in the inter-
ests of an enduring constitutional democracy. If we had been pre-
1954 judges confronted with a Jim Crow "separate but equal" ordi-
nance, would it have been moral to declare it constitutional? Were
judges before 1972 required to uphold gender discriminatory laws
because they reflected the stereotyped version of the moral nature
of women?
As judges enunciating fundamental values we should give
deference to consensus morality. But there are times when we
must transcend convention and recognize the more permanent val-
ues that come not just from our personal morality-though that
can rarely if ever be totally ignored-but from the underlying mo-
tifs of our national history, aspirations, and ideals. This morality,
according to Gilligan, is "aligned with 'the kind of integrity' that
comes from 'making decisions after working through everything
you think is involved and important in the situation,' and taking
responsibility for choice."5 7
I personally think the spectre of judges dominating the arena
of moral decision making is not all that realistic. Our jurispru-
dence bristles with presumptions in favor of the constitutionality
of legislation and executive actions. The judge who would over-
turn them labors under a heavy burden. She does not just reach
out and substitute her own set of values for those laid down by the
political branches. Only if the judge identifies and can articulate
an overriding value that has roots in prior precedents or in the
grand themes of the Constitution itself does she seriously enter-
tain the possibility of invalidating a majoritarian policy. Only
rarely does a lower court in fact declare legislative or executive ac-
tion unconstitutional. Last term in our court I don't remember
that it happened a single time. But the job of judges should not be
defined as upholding conventional morality against all challenge
but rather as giving a reasoned account of whether conflicting val-
ues or goals asserted to arise from the Constitution can be recon-
ciled with that morality or should override it.
The moral dialogue that cautious but courageous judges initi-
ate when-on rare occasions-they find majority morality at odds
with more enduring concepts in our Constitution marks the path
of a maturing constitutional jurisprudence. We should regard with
skepticism those judges and commentators who suggest this power
57. Id. at 147.
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cannot legitimately be exercised at all. As women judges, we can
contribute in our own special way to our nation's moral and consti-
tutional growth. Let us not default before we begin.

